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Abstract: According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E 
confirms H relative to background knowledge K just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K).  
This requires an inequality between the rational degree of belief in H determined 
relative to two bodies of total knowledge which are such that one (K&E) includes 
the other (K) as a proper part.  In this paper, I argue that it is quite plausible that 
there are no two possible bodies of total knowledge for ideally rational agents 
meeting this requirement.  Hence, the positive relevance account may have to be 
rejected. 
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A CONFLICT BETWEEN INDEXICAL CREDAL TRANSPARENCY & RELEVANCE 
CONFIRMATION 
 
1. Positive Relevance Confirmation and Total Evidence Sets 
According to the well-known probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, 
E confirms H just in case P(H/E) > P(H) for some suitable probability function.1  This 
account is justified by the intuitively plausible claim that E is evidence, in one 
relatively clear pre-theoretic sense, for H just in case knowledge of E makes it 
rational to be more confident that H is true (Maher 1996).  Of course, whether E is 
evidence for H often depends on what other evidence or background knowledge 
one possesses.  So, the more precise view is one according to which E confirms H, 
given background knowledge K, just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K). 
There are, to be sure, a wide variety of possible views on the nature of the 
probability function appearing in the aforementioned inequality.  Some objective 
                                                             
1 Some philosophers identify relevance confirmation with the holding of the 
inequality noted above on each of a set of probability functions (Maher 1996, 
163).  This wrinkle does not affect what follows. 
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Bayesians such as Carnap (1962) and, in their own way, Skyrms (1986) and 
Hawthorne (2005), maintain that P(H/E) represents, in the first instance, the 
objective degree of support which E provides for H and, in the second instance, the 
degree of belief in H which is therefore rational for any agent whose total evidence 
is E.2  They thereby ground the positive relevance account in the aforementioned 
intuition that E is evidence for H, given K, just in case an agent whose total evidence 
is K&E should be more confident that H than one whose total evidence is K alone. 
As the problem of old evidence (Glymour 1980) shows that the probabilities 
in the positive relevance account cannot simply be an agent’s credences—on pain of 
making it impossible for E to be evidence when E is known—many subjective or 
permissive Bayesians of various sorts take P(H/E) to represent the relevant agent’s 
historical or counterfactual degree of belief in H, conditional on E, either when E 
was not known or if E were to be not known.  They identify positive relevance 
                                                             
2  A similar sort of “objectivism” is also to be found in Horwich when he suggests 
that E confirms H if and only if “reason requires that with background 
assumptions B, anyone’s conditional degree of belief in H given E, should be 
greater than his unconditional degree of belief in H” (1982, 52). 
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confirmation of H, given K, by E, with an increase in the relevant agent’s confidence 
in H (Howson & Urbach 2006) upon actually or counterfactually adding knowledge 
of E to K.  Such Bayesians go on either to eschew any claim about the rationality of 
such an increased credence and thereby equate relevance confirmation by E with E’s 
causal power to increase an agent’s confidence in H, or, if they endorse a diachronic 
rational requirement to conditionalize, to claim that such an increase is rational only 
relative to the agent’s historical or counterfactual credences (which credences are 
likely constrained only by probabilistic coherence).3 
On all these views, relevance confirmation involves a relation between two 
possible bodies of total knowledge or evidence, where one (K&E) includes the other 
                                                             
3 See Maher (1996, 151-152) for reasons to think that subjective Bayesians are not 
analyzing the confirmation relation, but are instead analyzing what it is for a 
person to take E to be such that, if it were evidence, it would be evidence for H.  
(A similar charge is made by Horwich (1982, 51)).  See Kaplan (1996, 51) for just 
such an avowedly deflationary account, though one which tries to extend its 
application by claiming that one is never entitled to certainty in a contingent 
proposition. 
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(K) as a proper part.  In this paper, I show that no two possible bodies of total 
knowledge for an ideally rational agent can satisfy this condition if a plausible 
requirement on rational agents’ self-knowledge is correct.  Hence, we are forced to 
make an unpleasant choice between this plausible requirement of self-knowledge 
and the plausible positive relevance account of evidence. 
 
2. Rationality and Indexical Credal Omniscience 
Temporally indexical opinions are those which cannot be properly 
characterized without the use of the temporal indexical ‘now’ or its relatives.  
Personally indexical opinions are those which cannot be properly characterized 
without the use of the personal indexical ‘I’ or its relatives.  I simply assume here 
that there are indeed ‘essentially indexical’ opinions of both sorts (Perry 1979).  
Temporally indexical self-knowledge is a special sort of temporally and personally 
indexical knowledge—knowledge of one’s own current mental states as one’s own 
current mental states.  Especially significant in the present context is essentially 
temporally-cum-personally indexical certainty regarding one’s current credences.  
Letting ‘Ps,t(H) = x’ represent that agent s’s credence in proposition H at time t is x, 
and letting ‘Ps,t(Pmy,now(H) = x’ represent that s’s credence at t for the claim that her 
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own current credence in H is x (where the time and agent are both considered in an 
essentially indexical manner), consider the following requirement on ideally rational 
agents: 
 
Indexical Credal Transparency: Ps,t(H) = x only if Ps,t(Pmy,now(H) = x) = 1. 
 
Given probabilistic coherence at t (which I here assume required by ideal rationality) 
and some credence in H,4 this entails its converse 
                                                             
4 Note that I assume that ideally rational agents have some credence in each of the 
relevant propositions.  Some, like Titelbaum (2013), depart from this idealization 
of Bayesian orthodoxy and hold that a rational agent cannot conflict with ideal 
rationality in failing to have any credence at all in a proposition.  Still, Titelbaum 
holds that such agents can be required by ideal rationality to have a particular 
credence in a proposition if they have any credence in the proposition.  He would 
likely accept the claim that if Ps,t(H) = x then S is rationally committed to 
(Pmy,now(H) = x) = 1 if S has any credence at all in Pmy,now((H) = x)) at t.  Such 
“rational "commitments” will likely appear along with K or E&K on the right 
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Indexical Credal Infallibility: Ps,t(Pmy,now(H) = x) = 1 only if Ps,t (H) = x. 
 
I will refer to the conjunction of these doctrines as ‘Indexical Credal Omniscience’ 
but it is the former transparency doctrine that generates the problem of interest in 
this paper.5 
 Notice that Indexical Credal Transparency should be distinguished from a 
similar doctrine, Credal Transparency, according to which Ps,t(H) = x only if 
Ps,t(Ps,t(H) = x) = 1.  Credal Transparency does not require of an agent any essentially 
                                                             
side of the relevant conditional probabilities in the positive relevance account 
and so the problem developed in the next section will arise in a slightly different 
way. 
5 The arguments of this paper would go through given a weaker doctrine 
according to which ideal rationality requires merely certainty at each time as to 
whether or not one is certain at that time— Ps,t(H) < 1 only if Ps,t(Pmy,now(H) < 1) = 1 
and Ps,t(H) = 1 only if Ps,t(Pmy,now(H) = 1) = 1.  (Thanks to Kevin Dorst for pointing 
this out.) 
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indexical grasp of herself and the present time.  Hence, it would be satisfied by one’s 
being certain that some agent who one was unaware was oneself at a time one was 
unaware was the present time had the credence in H which one in fact then had.  I 
do not maintain that Credal Transparency is a requirement of ideal rationality.  One 
might be ideally rational while lacking knowledge of one’s identity and of the 
current time under suitable non-indexical modes of presentation.  So, even if I am 
required by ideal rationality to be certain that my current credence (grasped in the 
essentially indexical manner) in a given proposition is what it is, I am not required 
to be certain that the author of this paper has such a credence at 11:01pm on April 3, 
2018 even if I am the author and it is 11:01pm on April 3, 2018. 
There are a number of reasons to hold that an ideally rational agent must be 
indexically credally omniscient—certain, at a given time, of all and only the true 
claims about her (then) current credences (as her current credences).  As I am 
concerned in this paper merely to argue that such a doctrine is quite plausible and 
conflicts with the positive relevance account, I will here simply sketch some of the 
main reasons, leaving a detailed defense of the doctrine and responses to objections 
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for another occasion.6  It should, however, be noted that some of the defenses of 
Indexical Credal Transparency below are variations on the defenses Bayesians give 
of the synchronic norm of probabilistic coherence and so those Bayesians who wish 
to reject credal omniscience face the dialectical challenge of doing so whilst retaining 
a cogent defense of probabilistic coherence. 
The first reason is simply that the claim is intuitively plausible.  Even if we 
mere mortals cannot attain it, such knowledge of one’s own mind seems a 
requirement of ideal rationality.  Indeed, Sobel (1987, 69) suggests that “the extent of 
a person’s self-possession is . . . a partial determinant of his intellectual self.”  This 
line of thought is strengthened by the observation that rationality surely requires 
some degree of fit between an agent’s first-order credences at a time and her higher-
order personally-cum-temporally indexical credences regarding her credences at that 
time.  No ideally rational agent could, it seems, have a wholly mistaken conception 
of her own first-order credences under the requisite mode of presentation.  This being so, 
                                                             
6 In particular, a full defense would have to consider the probabilistic version of 
Williamson's argument (Williamson 2008) against luminosity (here called 
“transparency”). 
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it seems plausible that ideal rationality requires perfect self-knowledge of the relevant 
sort.  In this respect, such knowledge is quite unlike other contingent knowledge as 
a lack of other contingent knowledge is compatible with perfect rationality. 
A further reason to think the doctrine is intuitively plausible is the ease with 
which many discussions of “common knowledge” in game-theoretic settings assume 
that ideally rational agents are certain about their own credences.  Indeed, such 
introspective omniscience seems required for many of the proofs of common 
knowledge theorizing as it is required for an agent to make use of her knowledge 
that her own knowledge is also had by others in the game.  While some of these 
results may be obtained without assuming Indexical Credal Transparency, it 
remains unclear what can be so obtained and attempts to do so are clearly dealing 
with intuitively less than fully rational agents.   
Another reason for embracing Indexical Credal Transparency is the fact that it 
seems presupposed by the intuitive verdict on so-called “Thomason cases”—
counterexamples to the claim that a rational conditional probability is identical to a 
rational probability given knowledge of the condition.  One example of such a case 
is the intuition that P(I am certain that the NSA has surveilled me/The NSA has 
surveilled me) is quite low but P(I am certain that the NSA has surveilled me) is 
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very high (perhaps 1) if I am certain that the NSA has surveilled me.  That intuition, 
if an intuition about rationally required credence rather than what credence would 
be typical, seems simply to presuppose that rational epistemic probability obeys 
Indexical Credal Transparency.  Why else would certainty in the claim about the 
NSA rationally require a high probability in the claim regarding my own certainty 
about the NSA? 
A more theoretical reason for thinking that Indexical Credal Transparency is 
a requirement of ideal rationality is the fact that there is a synchronic Dutch Book 
argument for such a requirement because a Dutch Book can be made against any 
agent lacking such indexical credal omniscience (but not against those 
probabilistically coherent agents possessed of it) by a bookie who knows only what 
the agent’s credences presently are (Sobel 1987; Milne 1991).  Such a bookie can 
guarantee a profit simply by offering a bet based on the agent’s mistaken higher-
order credence and the agent is guaranteed, given the agent’s first-order credence, to 
lose that bet.  Hence, if, as many subjectivists maintain, synchronic Dutch Book 
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arguments provide a justification for probabilism, so also do they provide a 
justification for a requirement of Indexical Credal Transparency.7 
A final theoretical reason for endorsing Indexical Credal Transparency is to 
be found in the accuracy-based framework of epistemic utility theory (Joyce 1998; 
Pettigrew 2016).  If one violates Indexical Credal Transparency, then one’s credal 
state is a priori guaranteed to be less accurate than a credal state which is otherwise 
identical but satisfies Indexical Credal Transparency.8  This shows that the accuracy 
domination induced by failures of Indexical Credal Transparency is, again, wholly 
internal to the system of credences and so constitutes a genuine failing of rationality 
rather than a mere failure to know some contingent truth or other. 
                                                             
7 Christensen (2007) and Mahtani (2015) argue that the relevant Dutch Book 
argument is not one which reveals irrationality.  I contest Mahtani’s argument in 
my “Dutch Books and Logical Form” (forthcoming). 
8 Though she rejects Credal Transparency (and, presumably, Indexical Credal 
Transparency) as a rational requirement, Carr (2017) perspicuously notes that it 
is a consequence of many ways of developing epistemic utility theory. 
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Now, both the Dutch Book and accuracy arguments for Indexical Credal 
Transparency just sketched turn on holding fixed, as seems natural, the fact that an 
agent has the credences she does in assessing whether the agent’s credal state 
sanctions a sure loss set of wagers or is accuracy dominated by another set of 
credences.9  Caie (2013), however, argues, by appeal to a self-referential proposition, 
that both arguments for probabilism fail on this natural understanding.  If his 
arguments are sound, then friends of probabilism (which is here assumed) must 
accept some restriction on the situations in which accuracy arguments and Dutch 
Book arguments can support probabilism, or repudiate such arguments altogether 
and find support for probabilism elsewhere, or reject the notion that we should hold 
fixed a credal state in assessing its accuracy or loss inducing character at each world.  
The first option would fit naturally with endorsing a similar limitation on Indexical 
Credal Transparency and, so long as the exceptions are suitably restricted, leave my 
argument largely unaffected.  The second and third options would leave Indexical 
Credal Transparency without the support of accuracy arguments or Dutch Book 
                                                             
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for noting the controversy surrounding this 
assumption and suggesting that I address it. 
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arguments and reliant on other support.  Those who take the third option hold that 
the relevant worlds for assessing whether a set of bets is guaranteed to be a losing 
set or assessing if another set of credences dominates a given set include worlds 
where the agent’s credences are different or, more peculiarly, where the agent at 
issue doesn’t exist. 
While a full assessment of these complex issues is quite clearly beyond the 
scope of this paper, let me here simply note that the third option suffers significant 
implausibility.  First, such accounts implausibly allow that an agent may be ideally 
rational even though she is certain (or close to certain) that she doesn’t exist or that 
there are no credal states.  Second, assessing the rationality of an agent’s credal state 
in part by its inaccuracy at worlds where there are no agents and credal states or its 
sanctioning of wagers at worlds where no wagers are sanctioned by any credences 
seems to be of dubious coherence.  While we can assess whether a set of wagers is a 
winning or losing set if settled relative to what is true at a world with no agents or 
credences and we can assess the distance from the truth of a function from 
propositions to numbers in the [0, 1] interval at a world with no agents or credences, 
in both cases we are clearly not assessing any agent’s credences at that world.  It 
seems to me, however, that the core idea behind both Dutch Book and accuracy 
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domination arguments is the idea that a set of credences is rationally defective when 
an agent is in a position to know a priori that it sanctions a set of losing bets or is 
more inaccurate than an alternative set of credences, no matter what the extra-credal 
world is like. 
 Even if one endorses the third option above and rejects construals of Dutch 
Book and accuracy arguments on which they directly support indexical credal 
transparency, the ability of such arguments to support probabilism may, in fact, 
presuppose credal transparency.  This is because accounts of the rationality of various 
credal states seem to presuppose that one has access to one’s credal state.  After all, 
exclusively a priori knowledge that a given credal state sanctions a set of wagers 
guaranteed to be a losing set is insufficient to yield the result that one is irrational if 
one occupies that state.  One would need, in addition, reason to think that the loss 
sanctioning credal state was one’s own and Indexical Credal Transparency would 
capture this sort of access.  Similarly, knowledge that a given credal state is accuracy 
dominated is insufficient to yield the result that one is irrational in occupying that 
state.  One would again need, in addition, reason to think that the dominated credal 
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state was one’s own, knowledge of exactly the sort mandated by Indexical Credal 
Transparency.10  
It should be emphasized that the sort of introspective omniscience 
requirement supported by these considerations is limited to the doubly-indexical 
sort indicated earlier.  What is most intuitively plausible is that ideal rationality 
requires that one is certain of one’s own current opinions as one’s own current 
opinions, regardless of whether one has any non-indexical knowledge of the current 
time or of one’s own identity.  What the Dutch Book and accuracy domination 
arguments reveal is a difficulty wholly internal to one’s current credences, one the 
grasping of which requires of one no non-indexical grasp of the current time or of 
one’s identity, both of which might be thought to require contingent knowledge of 
non-indexical non-mental facts, which knowledge isn't entailed by ideal rationality.  
                                                             
10 Here it is worth noting that Konek and Levinstein’s recent (2019) account of 
epistemic utility theory, while not defending Indexical Credal Transparency on 
accuracy grounds, assumes its truth (§4.2-4.4) in order to yield plausible verdicts 
about cases in which one knows the truth of a proposition is dependent on one’s 
own credences. 
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These considerations do not support a requirement of credal omniscience regarding 
one’s non-indexically specified opinions, a diachronic requirement of self-
knowledge, or a synchronic general requirement of knowledge regarding personally 
indexical truths. 
 
3. The Conflict 
As previously indicated, the positive relevance account would have us 
determine whether E confirms H, relative to K, by comparing an epistemic situation 
in which an agent’s total knowledge is K to an epistemic situation in which her total 
knowledge is K&E.  What is required, in other words, is that there are two sets of 
possible certainties for a rational agent which are such that one is a proper subset of 
the other. 
If one were uncertain at t of E then one’s current credence in E would be some 
n less than 1.  Given Indexical Credal Transparency, in such a situation, one would 
have a credence of 1 that one now has such a credence in E—Ps,t(Pmy,now(E) = n) = 1.  
Consider, then, E’s being certain for one, either at the same time, t (the synchronic 
case), or a subsequent one, t+ (the diachronic case).  Take the synchronic case first.  If 
E were instead certain at t, then one would, given Indexical Credal Transparency, 
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instead be certain that one now has a credence of 1 in E, Ps,t(Pmy,now(E) = 1) = 1.  This 
yields a contradiction in the set of certainties as Ps,t(Pmy,now(E) = n) = 1 and Ps,t(Pmy,now(E) 
= 1) = 1 are inconsistent, given that n ≠ 1.  (The same result follows from the fact that 
when E is not certain, Ps,t(Pmy,now(E) = 1) = 0, and when E is certain, Ps,t(Pmy,now(E) = 1) = 
1, which contradict each other.)  Hence, the left side of the inequality at issue will be 
undefined.   
Consider, on the other hand, the diachronic case.  If E were to be certain at 
some later time, t+, one would (then) know that one (then) has credence 1, 
Ps,t+(Pmy,now(E) = 1) = 1.  Whether the set of certainties at t and at t+ contradict each 
other depends on whether the proposition expressed at t by Pmy,now(E) = n contradicts 
that expressed at t+ by Pmy,now(E) = 1, given that n ≠ 1.  If so, then the above problem 
remains.  If not, it must be because the proposition expressed at a time by the 
indexical claim is not even graspable at distinct times.11  In that case, there is no 
contradiction between the t and the t+ certainty sets, but it remains the case that the 
two diachronically distinct certainty sets cannot be such that one is a proper subset 
                                                             
11 I argue in my (2012) that this is a consequence of the three main views on 
temporally indexical credence. 
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of the other. 
I have framed the difficulty in terms of the qualitative relevance notion of 
confirmation but we should note that it applies equally to all reasonable proposals 
regarding the proper quantitative measure of relevance confirmation, i.e. the degree 
to which E confirms H.  These include the probability difference measure (Huber 
2008), according to which the measure is P(H/K&E) – P(H/K), the probability ratio 
measure (Milne 1996), according to which it is P(H/K&E) ÷ P(H/K), and the 
likelihood ratio measure (Zalabardo 2009), according to which it is P(E/H&K) ÷ 
P(E/~H&K).  The problem applies equally to such measures because they entail that 
the positive relevance account is the correct qualitative measure, merely imposing 
additional requirements to yield suitable quantitative measures.12 
                                                             
12 Moreover, the problem also afflicts the qualitative Likelihood Principle (Edwards 
1972) according to which E favors (in the likelihoodists’ proprietary sense) H1 
over H2 just in case P(E/H1&K) > P(E/H2&K), provided that K includes all 
rationally required knowledge and E represents all the knowledge gained with a 
new certainty. 
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In essence, the problem is that, given the requirement of Indexical Credal 
Transparency, it is impossible for there to be two sets of certainties which are such 
that, [a] they could each constitute the total certainty set of an ideally rational agent 
and, [b] one is a proper subset of the other.  Considered at two distinct times, an 
ideally rational agent must have at each time higher-order temporally indexical 
certainties which, depending on one’s views regarding temporally indexical 
statements, were either not even graspable at the other time or which contradict her 
certainties at the other time.  Considered counterfactually or merely possibly at a 
single time, she must have higher-level certainties which contradict her actual 
higher-level certainties at that time.  So, no two possible bodies of total knowledge 
for an ideally rational agent can be such that one is a proper subset of the other.  Just 
such a possibility, however, is what is required for an application of the positive 
relevance account. 
 
4. Revising the Positive Relevance Account? 
 It may be thought that the problem just outlined is simply an implication of 
the now widely recognized fact that standard conditionalization principles cannot 
properly accommodate temporally self-locating or temporally indexical credences 
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and that existing proposals for alternative diachronic principles can simply be 
adapted to solve the present problem.  Consider an agent watching a clock which 
she is certain is accurate, from 09:00 to 09:01.  When she learns that it is now 09:01 
she might be thought to come to know a proposition which she was previously 
certain was false and to be certain that a previously certain proposition is false.  If 
that is so, a straightforward application of the principle of conditionalization would 
imply, incorrectly, that all her subsequent credences should be undefined.   
 A number of proposals have been offered for how a rational agent’s 
credences ought to evolve over time in light of her changing essentially indexical 
knowledge.13  However, they are all unhelpful with the present problem as they all 
begin from the assumption that what one learns, in learning a temporally indexical 
proposition, is something in which one had either zero credence or no credence 
whatsoever at the prior moment.  More precisely, in accepting that there is 
essentially temporally indexical knowledge, they hold that there are credal states 
which are essentially synchronic and such that they cannot be had by one and the 
                                                             
13 For a helpful taxonomy of these many proposals and critical discussion see 
Titelbaum (2016). 
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same agent at distinct times or, alternatively, such that a rational agent can be 
certain that an indexical statement false at one time and certain that it is true at a 
subsequent one (or vice versa).  As I've shown, this, along with the Indexical Credal 
Transparency, implies that it is simply impossible to capture an ideally rational 
agent’s total knowledge at two distinct times in a manner which yields the result 
that the agent’s total knowledge at one time is a proper subset of the agent’s total 
knowledge at another time.14   
However, guided by some of these accounts of rational diachronic change, 
one might attempt to preserve the core of the positive relevance account by simply 
excluding the problematic temporally indexical self-knowledge from its scope so 
                                                             
14 The same point regarding the impossibility of diachronic monotonic increases in 
evidence could be made given a rational requirement to be certain at every time 
of the distinct proposition one would at that time express with “I exist now” 
(Pust 2007).  However, such a case will not suffice to preclude a wholly 
synchronic monotonic increase in total knowledge because the certainty at issue 
would remain unchanged by the addition of further non-temporally-indexical 
certainties. 
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that K&E could be a monotonic expansion of K.  Letting ‘E*’ and ‘K*’ stand for E and 
K when we exclude all temporally-cum-personally indexical claims about the agent’s 
credences from E and K, the suggestion would be that P(H/E*&K*) > P(H/K*) can 
stand in the relevant relation even if no ideally rational agent could be bereft of 
additional temporally indexical knowledge of her own credences and so neither K* 
nor K*&E* could constitute the entirety of an ideally rational agent’s knowledge. 
Unfortunately, this proposal unacceptably unmoors the positive relevance 
account from its intuitive justificatory rationale.  That rationale, recall, is that E is 
evidence for H, given K, when knowledge of E makes it rational to be more confident 
of H.  Even those subjectivists who eschew claims about the rationality of one’s 
degree of confidence in H treat E as evidence for H when one’s degree of confidence 
in H would be or was lower in the absence of knowledge of E, holding K constant.  
Hence, even if E* and K* have their content restricted in the manner under 
consideration, E* (alone) cannot be evidence unless a positive answer can be given to 
the counterfactual question, “How confident of H would S be if S were ideally 
rational and certain of E* but lacked accompanying indexical higher-order credence?”  
If ideal rationality does indeed require Indexical Credal Transparency, then, 
assuming that E*’s being evidence cannot require a failure of ideal rationality, the 
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counterfactual is a counterpossible and so, on standard semantics, vacuously or 
trivially true.  Hence, this rejoinder fails.15   
Setting aside the problem with invoking counterpossibles, notice that this 
proposal would also give us, at best, an account of what it is for E* to be evidence for 
H, relative to an epistemic situation which is not a possible situation of an ideally 
rational agent.  The envisaged restriction on the content of K* yields an account on 
                                                             
15 Proponents of the so-called “grounding relation” in contemporary metaphysics 
might claim that knowledge of E* (but not the higher-level knowledge of one’s 
knowledge of E* which, if one is fully rational, necessarily accompanies E*) 
rationally grounds or makes reasonable a higher confidence in H.  Grounding, it 
should be noted, is alleged to be a relation which allows one of two (or more) 
necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs to be the one which ”makes it the case” 
that another of the necessarily co-obtaining states of affairs obtains.  However, it 
has been plausibly argued that the sort of grounding at issue yields the non-
triviality of certain counterpossibles (Wilson 2018) and so those of us who adhere 
to orthodoxy on counterpossibles will find an appeal to grounding no escape 
from the dilemma here presented.  
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which H has a certain probability relative to K* and relative to K*&E* where K* and 
K*&E* don't capture possible certainty sets of an ideally rational agent.  At best, 
then, this proposal counts E* as evidence relative to a total knowledge set which isn't 
one of any possible ideally rational agent.  In general, however, we would reject the 
suggestion that E is evidence for H, relative to K, just in case, given K' (K less some 
proposition P) and E' (E less some proposition Q), P(H/K'&E') > P(H/K'). 
Accepting that E simply cannot be cleaved from the accompanying 
temporally indexical self-knowledge required by ideal rationality, one might instead 
try to amend the relevance account so as to allow the comparison of epistemic 
situations which are not such that one is a proper part of the other but which are 
otherwise relevantly similar.  So, where ‘E*’ and ‘K*’ are as before and ‘I-’ is the 
introspective knowledge when E* is uncertain and ‘I’ the introspective knowledge 
when E* is certain, it might be claimed that E* is evidence for H, given K*, when 
P(H/K*&E*&I) > P(H/K*&I-).   
Unfortunately, such a maneuver would, again, lose touch with the intuitive 
justificatory rationale behind the positive relevance conception.  That rationale, to 
repeat, is that E is evidence for H, relative to K, when knowledge of E makes it 
rational to be more confident in H or, for certain subjectivists, explains one’s being 
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more confident in H.  This clearly requires that we compare a situation in which E is 
known with an epistemic situation which is, but for knowledge of E, identical.  The 
envisaged proposal flouts this requirement.  Indeed, this proposal would seem, 
instead, to be a way of comparing the total confirmation which two distinct total 
bodies of evidence afford a particular hypothesis.  Such comparisons are, in my 
view, sensible and often known to be correct, but they cannot be said to be justified 
by the fundamental intuition behind the relevance conception of confirmation. 
The proposal just outlined may, however, be adapted to give us a plausible 
error theory of the cases in which it intuitively seems that the positive relevance 
account is correct.  According to this error theory, cases which have seemed aptly 
captured by the positive relevance account are really cases in which true comparative 
claims of total confirmation hold.  In cases which seem to support the positive 
relevance account, one’s epistemic situation has changed so as to make it reasonable 
to be more confident in some proposition but such a change is not, as required by the 
positive relevance account, a simple monotonic increase in one’s total evidence.  This 
error theory explains why we might mistakenly think the positive relevance account 
plausible by locating a true claim (concerning rationally greater confidence after a 
change in one’s epistemic situation) alongside a mistaken one (concerning merely 
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monotonic increases in certainties in the shift between those epistemic situations) 
where the mistake is an easy one to make because we often neglect to consider 
essentially indexical knowledge. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I conclude that the positive relevance account is at odds with what is quite 
plausibly the extent of an ideally rational agent’s self-knowledge.  Given Indexical 
Credal Transparency, cogent sense cannot be made of the notion that, with respect 
to a given body of total evidence, some part of that evidence justifies or explains an 
ideally rational agent’s having a higher confidence in some hypothesis than does the 
remainder of that evidence.  We must, therefore, confront the unpleasant dilemma of 
choosing whether to reject the positive relevance account or the requirement of 
Indexical Credal Transparency.  In light of the reasons outlined above for endorsing 
Indexical Credal Transparency and the explanation of the mistaken appeal of the 
positive relevance account just outlined, I am inclined to reject the positive relevance 
account.  However, those who would hold on to it must rebut the case for Indexical 
Credal Transparency while, ideally, preserving a suitable rationale for the 
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synchronic and diachronic probabilistic constraints required for the positive 
relevance account. 
  
29 
 
References 
Caie, M.  (2013).  “Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.”  Philosophical Review 122: 527-
575. 
Carnap, R.  (1962).  The Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd Edition.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Carr, J.  (2017).  “Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.”  Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 95: 511-534. 
Christensen, D.  (2007).  “Epistemic Self-Respect.”  Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 107: 319-337. 
Edwards, A. W. F.  (1972).  Likelihood.   Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Glymour, C.  (1980).  Theory and Evidence.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hawthorne, J.  (2005).  “Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need 
Both Notions.”  Mind 114: 277-320. 
Horwich, P.  (1982).  Probability and Evidence.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Howson, C. & P. Urbach.  (2006).  Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.  New 
York: Open Court. 
Huber, F.  (2008).  “Assessing Theories, Bayes Style.”  Synthese 161: 89-118. 
30 
 
Joyce, J.  (1998).  “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.”  Philosophy of Science 
65: 575-603. 
Kaplan, M.  (1996).  Decision Theory as Philosophy.  New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Konek, J. & B. A. Levinstein.  (2019).  “Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.”  
Mind 509: 69-107. 
Maher, P.  (1996).  “Subjective and Objective Confirmation.”  Philosophy of Science 63: 
149-174. 
Mahtani, A.  (2015).  “Dutch Books, Coherence and Logical Consistency.”  Nôus 49: 
522-537. 
Milne, P.  (1991).  “A Dilemma for Subjective Bayesians—And How to Resolve It.”  
Philosophical Studies 62: 307-314. 
Milne, P.  (1996).  “log[P(h/eb/P(h/b)] is the One True Measure of Confirmation.”  
Philosophy of Science 63: 21-46. 
Perry, J.  (1979).  “The Problem of the Essential Indexical.”  Nôus 13: 3-21. 
Pettigrew, R.  (2016).  Accuracy and the Laws of Chance.  New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
31 
 
Pust, J.  (2007).  “Cartesian Knowledge and Confirmation.”  Journal of Philosophy 104: 
269-289. 
Pust, J.  (2012).  “Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence.”  Journal of 
Philosophy 109: 295-315. 
Pust, J.  (forthcoming).  “Dutch Books and Logical Form.” 
Sobel, H.  (1987).  “Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies.”  Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 65: 56-81. 
Skyrms, B.  (1986).  Choice and Chance, 3rd Edition.  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Titelbaum, M.  (2013).  Quitting Certainties.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Titelbaum, M.  (2016).  “Self-Locating Credences.“  In A. Hajek and C. Hitchcock 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy.  New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Williamson, T.  (2008).  "Why Epistemology Can't be Operationalized."  In Q. Smith 
(ed.), Epistemology: New Philosophical Essays, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Wilson, A.  (2016).  “Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality.”  Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 96: 716-728. 
32 
 
Zalabardo, J.  (2009).  “An Argument for the Likelihood Ratio Measure of 
Confirmation.”  Analysis 69: 630-635. 
